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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (15 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-T674254

20 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*C. A. Stanfield*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96384  
"GUY-HIEM"

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14 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending  
31 October 1967 (RCS GSFOR-65) UIC WDG 3AA (U)

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## SECTION I SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

### A. COMMAND:

1. (U) On 25 August 1967 Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade re-located from Tan Son Nhut AFB, APO 96307 to Long Binh Post, APO 96384. The move was made without interruption of normal daily operations.
2. (U) On 16 September 1967 Major General Robert R. Williams, 022962, assumed command of the 1st Aviation Brigade. The former commander, Major General George F. Seneff Jr., 023738, was reassigned to command the Third Infantry Division, USAEUR.
3. (U) At the end of the reporting period the organization and location of major units were as shown in the organization chart at Incl 1 and the station list at Incl 2.
4. (U) During the reporting period Commander's Notes 15 and 16 were published. See Inclosures 3 and 4.

### B. PERSONNEL, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

1. (FOUO) Strength as of quarter's end, 31 October 1967 was as follows:

	AUTH	ACCOUNTABLE STRENGTH ASG	OPERATING STRENGTH PFD
OFF	1,606	1,602	1,517
WO	2,212	1,708	1,638 Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
EM	15,155	15,196	14,584 Declassified after 12 years
TOTAL	18,973	18,506	17,739

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2. (C) Enlisted overstrength decreased considerably since implementation of the US-RV program to reduce combat support units to 100% authorized strength. Continued emphasis is being placed on further strength reductions and proper assignment and utilization of enlisted personnel. Concurrently a study will be initiated to determine those Brigade units to be classified as combat rather than combat support units (i.e. armed helicopter companies, air cavalry squadrons).

3. (FOUO) The command continues to have critical shortages in the helicopter technical inspector, all helicopter and fixed wing mechanic and all avionics MOSs.

4. (U) The arrival of new OV-10 and CH-47 units in-country has provided sufficient personnel resources to institute a successful in-fusion program among all Brigade OV-10 and CH-47 units.

5. (U) The number of recommendations for awards (Purple Heart and higher) received during the period 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967 are shown by type, with totals for the period and monthly averages:

AWARD	TOTAL FOR PERIOD	MONTHLY AVERAGE
LM & DSC	33	11
SS	46	16
SM	31	11
DFC	540	147
AM	19,790	6,579
DSM	568	190
PH	146	49
ACM	868	290
BSM "V"	111	37
AM "V"	659	220
ACM "V"	202	68
TOTAL	22,994	7,636

C. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (FOUO) During the period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967 the S-3 concentrated on Escape and Evasion Training, personnel security investigations and personnel security orientations.

2. (FOUO) During this period the following number of students were sent to the Escape and Evasion Schools indicated:

- a. Jungle Survival - 91
- b. Sea Survival - 48

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3. (FOUO) Personnel Security Investigations:

a. Aviation Group Commanders were delegated the authority to validate TOP SECRET clearances upon completion of favorable USAIRR check. (Par 6, USARV Reg 604-5, Personnel Security Clearance, 15 Jul 67).

b. Battalion and higher commanders were delegated authority to grant SECRET clearances provided a valid, favorable security investigation is present in the individual's file. (TWX AVHGB-C, 10 Oct 67).

c. The following personnel security investigations and actions were processed through this headquarters:

- (1) Verification of BI - 187
- (2) Verification of NAC, ENTNAC - 333
- (3) Request for NAC - 94
- (4) Request for BI - 8

4. (FOUO) Two (2) after hours security inspections of Brigade Headquarters were conducted during the reporting period. No significant security violations were discovered.

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1. (FOUO) A total of one combat aviation group (provisional), one combat aviation battalion (provisional), one cavalry squadron, eleven aviation companies and nineteen detachments were added to the strength of the 1st Aviation Brigade during this quarter. The following units arrived on dates indicated:

10 Aug 67

190th AHC  
605th TC Det  
520th Med Det  
9th SC Det

5 Oct 67

242nd ASBC  
621st TC Det  
541st Med Det

17th AHC  
613th TC Det  
722nd SC Det  
540th Med Det

135th AHC  
614th TC Det  
68th SC Det

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8 Oct 67	245th SAC 647th TC Det 538th SC Det
24 Oct 67	25th CAC 57th AHC 615th TC Det 822nd SC Det
25 Oct 67	203rd RAC
26 Oct 67	201st CAC
28 Oct 67	192nd AHC 607th TC Det 65th SC Det
	7/17 Air Cav Sqdn 40th TC Det
29 Oct 67	243rd ASHC 620th TC Det
31 Oct 67	235th AHC 608th TC Det 190th SC Det
	195th AHC 609th TC Det 366th SC Det
	3/17 Air Cav Sqdn 39th TC Det

2. (C) The Falcon Combat Aviation Group (Prov), operating under the operational control of the 17th CAG, and Phantom Combat Aviation Battalion (Prov), operating under the operational control of the 13th CAB, were organized to simplify command and control of subordinate units. This was necessitated by the rapid expansion and growth of aviation elements in the I, II, and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

3. (C) The AH-1G attack helicopter and the U-21A utility fixed wing aircraft arrived in theater. New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) accompanied each aircraft type and are currently training pilots and support maintenance personnel. The AH-1G NETT trains twelve pilots each two weeks. The U-21A NETT trains eight pilots each two weeks. As trained personnel arrive from CONUS training bases the NETT training load will be reduced accordingly.

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4. (U) Flight Status Orders. During the quarter ending 31 October 1967 the flight status orders section received and processed 3800 requests for flight status orders or changes to existing orders.

a. During the past quarter the 1st Aviation Brigade gained 38 aviation and direct support units. Many of these units were the first of their kind for the Brigade, consequently it was necessary to research TO&E's, MTO&E's and General Orders effecting the personnel structure of these units to determine flight status positions.

b. With the rapid organization and deployment of Aviation units from CONUS, personnel have not been given adequate time to obtain flight status orders while in CONUS. Coupled with the infusion of personnel after arrival in-country this caused an increased number of requests for flight status orders and resulted in numerous notifications of change in duty position.

c. As a result of the increased volume of requests for flight status orders, Brigade Regulation 600-1, dtd 24 Nov 66, governing requests for flight status orders, has been revised to insure that this program is closely monitored at each level of command. The draft of the revised regulation is presently being staffed.

d. During this reporting period the 1st Aviation Brigade was delegated authority to publish orders awarding aeronautical designations for Senior Army Aviators and Flight Surgeons.

5. (U) Training:

a. VMAF Training: UH-1D transition training of VMAF personnel continued throughout the reporting period with a class of 15 students graduating on 15 August 1967. Class number 6 (15 students) started on 12 September and is scheduled to graduate on or about 12 December 1967. No major problems have been encountered and the program continues to run smoothly.

b. Australian Training: Arrangements were made to integrate a Royal Australian Naval Contingent, consisting of 12 officers and 28 enlisted men, into an assault helicopter company. Since arrival in early October, the aviators have received in-country orientations and are operational in various assignments throughout the company.

c. Cobra NETT Training: The Cobra NETT training started on 18 September 1967. Various courses include instruction in pilot transition, air frame maintenance, engine maintenance, armament maintenance and SIS/avionics maintenance. Although some aircraft maintenance difficulties were encountered which delayed the starting date one week, the courses are now on schedule and the programmed student output has been achieved. From 18 September 1967 to 31 October 1967 the following

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students were trained and graduated from courses indicated:

(1) Aviator Transition Course	23
(2) Air Frame Maintenance	26
(3) Engine Maintenance	7
(4) SIS/Avionics Maintenance	23
(5) Armament Maintenance	19
(6) Air Frame Familiarization	4

d. U-21 Training (NETT): The U-21 NETT started training on 4 September 1967 for a four month period. By 31 October 1967 the following personnel were trained and graduated:

(1) Aviators	58
(2) Engine Mechanics	36
(3) Air Frame Mechanics	68

E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Protective Armor:

a. A survey was conducted throughout the 1st Aviation Brigade to determine unit requirements for body armor and ballistic helmets. Both items have been critically short for some time. It was determined that the Brigade has an unfilled requirement for 4,120 ballistic helmets, 900 sets of front and back and 2,743 sets of front plates of ceramic body armor. Additional requirements generated by incoming units are expected to add to these figures.

2. (U) CMFI Inspections:

a. IAW AR 750-8, a temporary CMFI team was formed to inspect the 334th AHC. Personnel from non-Brigade and subordinate units were placed on the team for a period of two days. Two non-Brigade personnel were requested for three days because of travel requirements from another post.

b. Three days prior to the CMFI a one hour conference was held for the purpose of explaining policies, inspection procedures and CMFI scoring.

c. The 334th AHC received a 4½ hour notice and was inspected with satisfactory results.

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3. (U) Aircraft Maintenance and Armament:

a. The arrival of UH-1H helicopters in-country has fallen behind schedule. This has resulted in an adverse effect on the UH-1D retrograde program by severely limiting the availability of attrition fill aircraft within the Brigade. Brigade-wide aircraft shortages will worsen through December, based on current attrition rates, if the UH-1H production/delivery schedule continues to fail to meet programmed goals.

b. The AH-1G (Cobra) arrived in-country on 1 September. The NETT received six (6) AH-1G's and an additional six (6) were allocated to the 334th AHC. Design problems common to the introduction of any new piece of equipment arose and the additional six (6) AH-1G helicopters were initially used to augment the NETT fleet. This enabled the training schedule to be met. When the design problems were solved these AH-1Gs were assigned to the 334th AHC.

c. UH-1G helicopters remain in short supply and receipt of AH-1Gs in quantities to alleviate this shortage will not occur before January 1968.

d. The L-13 engine, installed in AH-1G and UH-1H model helicopters, has developed problems with the N-1 nozzle. Cracks in the nozzle have caused replacement of nozzles every 300 hours. Due to shortages of N-1 nozzles, procedures were established to exchange engines at the unit level rather than replace the component part. The problem was further aggravated by existing shortages of L-13 special tools. This headquarters has been informed that modified N-1 nozzles are in production and delivery is expected by mid-January.

e. The slow delivery of UH-1H models for attrition replacement and float has caused a shortage of lift aircraft within the Brigade. The retrograde of aircraft for rebuild during the months of September and October was delayed in order to partially alleviate this shortage. Retrograde will continue to be postponed until deliveries can meet programmed schedules.

f. CH-47 units are approaching 1200 hours per month flying time, a 165% utilization based on DA norms. This increased flying time is beginning to reflect in increased Brigade EDP rates. The situation is further aggravated by the number of helicopters going into the 6th and 12th ME.

F. INFORMATION:

1. (U) During the reporting period, the brigade initiated publication of a monthly 20 page magazine entitled HAWK. The first issue was September 1967. Contractual arrangements required more than four months to complete and necessitated two trips to the commercial printer in

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Okinawa. Printing had to be done out-of-country due to limitations on spending piasters in RVN. Funds (\$750 per issue) were granted by Saigon Central Welfare fund to publish 3,500 copies per month; this process required two of the four months of preparation. Distribution is made on the basis of 1 copy per 6 individuals assigned. More than 100 copies are mailed to CONUS posts, magazines, wire services and news syndicates. The magazines have been exceptionally well received and have proven to be a very acceptable medium for Command Information dissemination. The magazine contains feature stories, command information items, cartoons and articles on specific aviation subjects.

2. (U) Until approval of new ETOE's for brigade, group and battalion headquarters, information offices within this unit remain without an authorization for photographic equipment. Several sources of funds/equipment other than issue (e.g. non-appropriated funds) have been tried to no avail. In the past twelve months, in this Headquarters' Information Office alone, a considerable amount of personal funds have been spent to procure photographic and darkroom equipment and supplies.

G. SIGNAL:

1. (U) Coordination effected with USARV C-E has resulted in a complete examination of all AM (UHF, VHF, HF and LF) frequencies authorized 1st Aviation Brigade and its subordinate units. It was found that many authorized frequencies were not being used and conversely many frequencies were being used for which there was no authorization. The study has resulted in better utilization of available frequencies and the periodic machine-run-off of assigned frequencies published by USARV will permit future monitoring of this problem area.

2. (U) During the reporting period there was an increase in distribution of high frequency radios to Brigade units. Two types of radios have been received to date. Radio teletypewriter set AN/VSC-2 and radio set AN/TRC-146 (SSB, AM and CW). The radio teletypewriter set AN/VSC-2 is ½ ton vehicle mounted. The AN/TRC-146 is a semi-portable (480 pounds), non-vehicular voice only set primarily designed for fixed base operation. To date, distribution has been made to group and battalion level, although eventual distribution to company is planned.

3. (FOUO) USARV C-E indicates that 13 of a total of 44 communication facilities, AN/MRC-119 were due to arrive in-country in October. Forty of these facilities are for issue to the 1st Aviation Brigade assault helicopter companies. The AN/MRC-119 provides HF, FM and UHF communications in fixed and portable configuration. It is mounted in a ½ ton vehicle and trailer.

4. (U) The 9th Signal Detachment (RL team avionics), originally deployed to support the 190th Assault Helicopter Company, was attached to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment effective 30 September 1967 and

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became operational 2 October 1967. The 11th AHC, having no assigned or attached direct support avionics maintenance capability and located a considerable distance from the nearest general support facility, required "on-site" support. The 190th Assault Helicopter Company now receives direct support avionics maintenance from a signal detachment assigned to another company collocated at the same airfield.

5. (U) Avionics test equipment peculiar to a specific avionic system is being repaired through avionics maintenance channels rather than 1st Logistical Command channels. This has proven to be a more responsive and desirable procedure, though limited in capability. As soon as the 34th General Support Group can expand its test equipment repair facility to meet the entire SEM demand, deadline electronics test equipment at direct support and general support maintenance shops will be reduced. Workloads for the 34th General Support Group electronic maintenance shops decreases with the availability of test equipment and repair parts at the direct support level.

H. SURGEON:

1. (U) An influx of 26 flight surgeons during the month of October (19 to 1st Aviation Brigade and 7 to other USARV assignments) alleviated a 40% shortage of Brigade Flight Surgeons. In the interim, general medical officers were used to provide at least minimal medical coverage.

2. (U) Two (2) new medical detachments (OM) arrived in-country and were assigned to units of the 1st Aviation Brigade. They were the 520th Med Det, attached to the 190th AHC, 145th Aviation Battalion located at Bien Hoa, RVN, and the 541st Med Det, attached to the 187th AHC, 269th Aviation Battalion located at Tay Ninh, RVN. This latter assignment introduced aeromedical coverage for the first time at Tay Ninh.

3. (U) The 93rd Medical Detachment was transferred from the 145th Aviation Battalion at Bien Hoa to the 214th Aviation Battalion at Long Binh Post. The 433rd Medical Detachment was transferred from An Son to the 268th Aviation Battalion at Phu Hiep.

4. (U) Three additional OM Medical Detachments were scheduled to arrive in-country in October, but a USARV decision cut them from the troop list. After the need for these medical detachments was clarified, this decision was reversed. However, a new arrival date has not been set.

5. (U) HCV conducted a Medical Cross-Service Support Survey to determine if support spaces could be converted into combat spaces by consolidating support activities duplicated at any given location. Aeromedical support units were examined in detail by this survey; however, this headquarters was able to establish the need for separate Army aeromedical facilities at the locations in question.

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6. (U) MTOE's were submitted which would make Army aeromedical support organic to each aviation unit. This change would both prevent the recurring threat of losing aeromedical support and allocate one flight surgeon per aviation company rather than two as is presently the case.

7. (U) Two flight surgeons on a USABIVR Aviation Safety Survey Team, visiting RVN during the reporting period, were briefed extensively on the aeromedical situation and problems in RVN. As a result of these briefings and visits to aviation units, the survey team confirmed that aeromedical coverage for Army aviation units was inadequate and recommended flight surgeons be allocated on the basis of one per aviation company.

8. (U) A survey was instituted to gather data on relative desirability of jungle boots versus leather boots for inflight use by Army aircrow members. It is felt that the leather boot provides more foot and ankle protection from the trauma of aircraft accidents or hostile fire. Also the jungle boot contains nylon reinforcements which could melt from the heat of a post crash fire and cause serious burns. Data is lacking at the present time to substantiate these statements.

9. (U) Recurring activities performed by this office included the review of all subordinate Command Health Reports and other medical reports submitted to USARV, review of all Class I, II and III flight physicals performed in RVN, granting of waivers on Class III flight physicals, recommending disposition on aeromedical cases referred for consultation by subordinate units, providing outpatient dispensary medical care to over 1000 patients, and performance of flight physicals.

I. SAFETY:

a. (U) During this period, a Da team conducted a survey of Army aviation in RVN. A member of the brigade aviation safety office accompanied this team which spent twelve days visiting 1st Aviation Brigade and divisional aviation units in the I and II CTZ areas. An aviator questionnaire was completed by approximately 3,000 aviators. Tabulations of the questionnaire have not been made and disseminated as of this date. One of the significant findings of the survey was the effect of the large influx of newly graduated aviators into RVN. The inexperience of those new aviators has contributed to the high accident rate in RVN. A complete report of the findings and recommendations of the survey team has been published under separate cover and will be reproduced in sufficient copies for distribution to each aviation unit of company size or larger (Letter, HQ USARPAC, GFOP-DT, subject: Army Aviation Survey in RVN, dated 11 October 1967).

2. (U) The accident rate during this period reflected a downward trend from the previous reporting period, dropping from 32.3% to 28.4%.

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The drop is attributed to greater command emphasis on the use of established procedures. Units of the 1st Aviation Brigade have completed marking the tops of rotor blades with a white stripe. For a discussion of rotor blade marking, see the ORLL for period ending 31 July 1967, Headquarters 1st Aviation Brigade, dated 14 August 1967.

J. CHAPLAIN: (U) Captain (Chaplain) Nathaniel C. Giannattasio received the third highest award for valor, the Silver Star, for service performed last year during Operation Attleboro. Captain Giannattasio was assigned to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade at the time and is now assigned to the 13th Aviation Battalion with duty station at Vinh Long Army Airfield.

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## SECTION II

### PART I OBSERVATION (LESSONS LEARNED)

- A. PERSONNEL: None
- B. OPERATIONS: None
- C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None
- D. INTELLIGENCE: None
- E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Item: Ceramic body armor for pilots and crewmembers of 1st Aviation Brigade.

Discussion: Currently an acute shortage of ceramic body armor exists. 1st Logistical Command presently has no assets. Items scheduled to arrive in-country in September have not yet arrived. This headquarters is planning a redistribution of body armor within the Brigade to insure a more equitable availability throughout the command.

Observation: After Brigade redistribution of body armor, units of this command will remain approximately 40% short but will be able to meet minimal operational requirements for these items. However, further shortages caused by combat loss or the arrival of new units will reduce assets below those required for daily operation.

2. (U) Item: Ballistic helmets for pilots and crewmembers.

Discussion: Currently an acute shortage of Ballistic helmets exists. 1st Logistical Command presently has no assets or projected delivery dates for this item. A sizing problem also indicates a larger size helmet is required.

Observation: AMC should be notified of total requirements for all aviation units in the theater. Upon completion of production, items should be airlifted to RVN. AMC should provide firm delivery dates as soon as possible.

3. (U) Item: General aircraft mechanics tool kit.

Discussion: Currently an acute shortage of General Aircraft Mechanics tool kits exists for 1st Aviation Brigade units. A total of 106 kits are presently required. This large shortage is due to a failure to receive initial fill and continuing combat losses. The item

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is issued to all crew chiefs and accompanies them on flights. If their aircraft crashes and burns, the tool kit is normally destroyed because it is not a priority item for aircraft evacuation. In order for a unit to requisition replacement under the present system, 153 separate requisitions must be submitted.

Observation: This item accompanies aerial flights and is therefore much more susceptible to loss than other tool kits and sets that remain in base camp.

4. (U) Item: Composition of the Brigade CMII Team.

Discussion: A new Brigade CMII Team is created for each inspection. It is organized using members of other commands for inspectors, because the Brigade is not authorized personnel in some of the required inspector MOSs (ammunition surveillance NCO, small arms inspector, vehicle maintenance foreman and a POL surveillance NCO). The utilization of non-Brigade personnel has created serious difficulties in constituting, briefing, and supervising each CMII Team. To inspect every company size unit (attached elements included) a CMII inspection must be conducted at least twice a week, on a scheduled basis. It has not been possible to conduct inspections more frequently than once every 3 weeks using the present system...

Observation: Without the assignment of a permanent CMII Team, including all required MOSs, this headquarters will be unable to inspect each Brigade unit on a yearly basis as required by AR 750-8.

5. (U) Item: Construction of revetments.

Discussion: Construction of revetments has proceeded rapidly and with structurally sound results in areas which had adequate engineer support. Engineer support is primarily essential for design and fill of revetments.

a. A standard revetment design for each type aircraft is not the best solution because each area must use the materials most available in that location. This requires a different design for each type of material. For this design to be structurally sound it should be processed through the engineering section of a battalion headquarters. There are several instances where revetments were constructed without benefit of analytical design and subsequently failed, causing unnecessary expenditure of manhours and materials.

b. The time and labor consuming phase of building revetments is filling the frame structure with earth. The average UH-1 revetment uses approximately 2,000 cubic feet of fill. The average CH-47 revetment requires approximately 5,400 feet of fill. When multiplied by the number of aircraft in a unit this becomes a formidable earth moving

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effort. If engineer earth moving equipment is available the task can be accomplished in a short period of time. If the aviation unit is required to fill the revetments without engineer equipment, it requires several weeks of maximum effort with the expenditure of an unacceptable number of valuable manhours.

Observations: Revetments constructed by engineer units are the most economical from a man power standpoint. Revetments constructed by self-help normally require an unacceptable length of time to complete. Engineer constructed revetments have normally proven to be of superior design and durability to locally constructed revetments.

F. SIGNAL

1. (U) Item: HF radio set AN/TRC-146 Maintenance.

Discussion: A special requirement purchase of 11 Radio Sets AN/TRC-46 has been received for distribution within the brigade, groups and battalions. These radios were ordered over one year ago to fill a gap before the AN/VSC-2 Radios arrived. Accompanying the radios is a one year supply of spare parts. However, apparently no plans or provisions were made for maintenance on the radios. The AN/TRC-146 is essentially an AN/ARC-102 aircraft set repackaged for ground use. However, certain major components such as the antenna coupler and power supply are not common to the ARC-102. At the present time this headquarters has found no organization capable of repairing these parts in-country.

Observation: When a non-standard item is brought into Vietnam to fill a special requirement, a maintenance plan must be prepared before arrival of the equipment. Representatives of the Signal Section are now working on the problem with USARV G-4 and C-E, in an attempt to assign support to either 1st Logistical Command or the 34th CS Group.

2. (U) Item: Installation of teletype circuits to 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters at Long Binh.

Discussion: In accordance with the projected move of the 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters to Long Binh from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, a request for four teletype circuits was submitted to 2nd Signal Group on 3 July 1967. The requested date for installation was 10 August 1967. Due to numerous problems concerning construction and telephone availability, 2nd Signal Group was notified of a slippage due to the week of 21-25 Aug. Although constant assurance was given by the 2nd Signal Group (later by 160th Signal Group) and USARV Signal, the first teletype circuits were not installed until 2 October, over 5 weeks later than the date requested.

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Observation: Major units, such as this headquarters, require a higher signal installation priority to preclude loss of communications services for extended periods of time.

3. (FOUO) Item: Aviation unit callsigns.

Discussion: It is common practice for Brigade units to choose their own callsign for use in RVN. Upon USARV approval, this becomes the permanent unclassified unit callsign. With the large number of units presently in RVN, new units have chosen permanent callsigns already in use by another organization. Some units have designed and ordered patches based on a callsign which was later disapproved because of prior use by another unit. Non-Brigade units have also inadvertently chosen callsigns in use by Brigade elements.

Observation: Units must utilize only those callsigns approved through Headquarters USARV.

4. (U) Item: Provisioning for new avionics and surveillance equipment deployed to SEA.

Discussion: All levels of maintenance support for avionics and surveillance equipment recently deployed to Vietnam (i.e. AN/ARC-131, AN/ARC-134, AN/UAS-4A) has been complicated by the non-availability of proper electronic test equipment, spare parts and float components. Even when limited quantities of spare parts and test equipment are available in the theater there are not sufficient quantities to support the existing number of systems spread over a large geographic area. Often when test equipment and spare parts become sufficient in quantity to begin systems repair at direct support levels, those repairmen who received the new equipment training have either rotated to CONUS or lost proficiency through lack of practice.

Observation: New electronic equipment should not be deployed to RVN until all provisioning is complete in accordance with AR 700-70. To do otherwise taxes the capabilities of the direct and general support maintenance units.

5. (U) Item: Qualifications of airborne radar repairman MOS 26M20.

Discussion: The airborne radar repairman, according to AR 611-201, should be qualified, or at least school trained, to repair radar altimeter (AN/APN-22), doppler (AN/ASN-64), SLAR (AN/UPO-2), and weather radar (AN/APN-158). Experience has proven that the majority of MOS 26M20 repairmen arriving as replacements are trained on either SLAR or doppler but not both. Often, the skill that is required in the gaining unit is the one the replacement repairman does not possess.

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Observation: All airborne radar repairmen deployed to Vietnam should be fully school trained and qualified on all airborne radar equipment employed in SEA.

C. MEDICAL:

1. (U) Item: Recruitment of Aviation Medical Officers.

Discussion: In attempting to determine the causes of the severe flight surgeon shortage in RVN this headquarters was told that there were insufficient volunteers to fill classes held in this MOS (3160). In contradiction to this claim, several general medical officers arriving in RVN stated that they had requested flight surgeon training but were refused it. It was reported that there is no active recruitment program for this specialty at the Medical Field Service School, where all new Army doctors receive their initial orientation training.

Observation: An active recruitment effort at the Medical Field Service School should enable the Army to fill its flight surgeon classes.

2. (U) Item: Sizing of Aircrewman's Fragmentation Helmet (AFH-1).

Discussion: A large number of AFH-1 helmets shipped to RVN cannot be worn, due to an error in sizing. Approximately one half of the available helmets are too small for use, causing an actual shortage of this item at the operational unit. Additional production of large and extra large sized ballistic helmets is required immediately.

Observation: There is a requirement to start production of large and extra large sized AFH-1 helmets on an expedited basis.

3. (U) Flight physicals for aviators on assignment to RVN.

Observation: Many Army Aviators arrive in RVN without having had a flight physical within 75 days of their CONUS departure. Apparently, this POR requirement is not adequately publicized or enforced.

Observation: The POR requirement for Army Aviators to have a current flight physical not more than 75 days prior to their CONUS departure for RVN is not being met.

4. (U) Item: Flight physicals for crewchiefs on assignment to RVN.

Discussion: Many crewchiefs arriving in RVN have had an initial flight physical at Fort Rucker prior to their departure from that post. However, because the physical had not been reviewed and approved by the time the crewchief leaves for RVN, he arrived here with no evidence of

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having had a flight physical. The approved physical is often lost, making it necessary to repeat the examination in RVN where aeromedical resources are already overburdened.

Observation: If crewchiefs were given a single carbon copy of their flight physical at Fort Rucker, it would be unnecessary to repeat the physical in RVN. Unnecessary duplication of effort and inconvenience to the individual and to his unit could be avoided.

H. SAFETY:

1. (U) Item: Night Gunship Operations.

Discussion: A mid-air collision recently occurred between two gunships operating at night. The ships and crew belonged to a recently arrived aviation organization. One of the gunships was operating without running or anti-collision lights. The wing man failed to keep his normal position in relation to the lead gunship and the two aircraft struck head on after making clockwise and counter-clockwise turns at the same altitude. The unit had no SOP for night gunship operations.

Observation: It is mandatory that units have a detailed written SOP for night operations and that crews are qualified and indoctrinated in proper procedures. Minimum lighting and altitude separation procedures should be established for collision avoidance.

2. (U) Item: O-1 Groundloop Accidents.

Discussion: O-1 groundloop accidents have been occurring with increasing frequency. With the introduction of the tricycle geared T-41 into the training fleet at Fort Stewart, student aviators are now receiving considerable less student pilot time in the O-1.

Observation: Since newly graduated fixed wing aviators arrive in RVN with little O-1 experience, it is mandatory they receive in-theater indoctrination, orientation and standardization training (to include emphasis on take offs and landings) and that these aviators receive closer supervision during their first months in-country.

SECTION II

PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL: None.

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B. OPERATIONS: None

C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None

D. INTELLIGENCE: None

E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) AMC should be notified of requirements for body armor. Items should be airlifted to RVN as they are produced.

2. (U) Exception recommendations to requisitioning procedures should be established for the General Aircraft Mechanics Tool Kit. Units should be allowed to requisition the tool kit complete instead of submitting 153 separate requests for each component item. This would also facilitate timely and accurate follow-up procedures by unit supply personnel.

F. SIGNAL:

1. (U) Higher headquarters should consult maintenance support activities prior to waiving the requirements of AR 700-70 when new electronic systems are procured for deployment to SEA.

2. (U) All airborne radar repairmen, MOS 26120, should be fully school trained, and qualified on all airborne radar equipment employed in SEA prior to deployment.

3. (U) Sponsoring headquarters must query incoming units on desired callsigns while unit is in CONUS, and then secure USAFV approval for the proposed callsign.

G. MEDICAL:

1. (U) An active and consistent recruitment program should be initiated at the Army Medical Field Service School, Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to obtain sufficient volunteers to fill all classes for flight surgeon training.

2. (U) Production of additional Aircrewman's Fragmentation Helmets (AFH-1) in the large and extra large sizes should be started as soon as possible to make up for critical shortages in RVN.

3. (U) Emphasis must be given to the POR requirement for aviators assigned to RVN to have a flight physical examination.


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4. (U) Crew chiefs receiving flight physicals prior to departure for RVN should be given a carbon copy of the physical. This would preclude a duplicate examination if the original copy is lost.

H. SAFETY: None

  
JACK W. HEMINGWAY  
Colonel, Infantry  
Deputy Brigade Commander

4 Incl

1. Organizational Chart
2. Station List
3. Commander's Notes #15
4. Commander's Notes #16

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

DISTRIBUTION:

1. Thru Channels to ACSFOR DA (original copy)
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AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 67) 1st Ind (C)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 October  
1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) UIC WDG 3A4 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for  
Force Development, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade (DG3A).

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning ceramic body armor, page 12, paragraph E1: Concur. There is currently a shortage of the armor. A request to procure sufficient quantities for RVN through June 1968 has been submitted. The request includes a replacement factor and quantities for limited stockage. Estimated cost to satisfy in-country requirement is four million dollars. CONARC has requested USAMC to issue initial quantities to units deploying to RVN.

b. Reference item concerning ballistic helmets, page 12, paragraph E2: Concur. AMC has been notified and has taken action to modify existing helmets and to procure quantities required. During October and November an AMC representative visited RVN with modification procedures and instructions.

c. Reference item concerning Brigade CMMI Team, page 13, paragraph 4: Concur. USARV Regulation 750-8 was viewed unfavorably by the recent USARPAC IG Inspection, in terms of inadequate implementation of AR 750-8. In the course of republishing USARV Regulation 750-8, a more clearly defined command position on CMMI requirements will be developed. No significant deviation from the basic Army regulation will be made. The specialists required to perform CMMI's for this, and other similar size units, are not available and the outlook for increased assets of this type does not look promising. Target date for republication of USARV Regulation 750-8 is mid-January 1968.

*Downgraded at 3 year Intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10*

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1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 October  
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d. Reference item concerning HF Radio Set, AN/TRC-146, page 14, paragraph F1: Concur. This headquarters is presently coordinating the assignment of the support responsibility for this radio set. It is also in the process of clarifying maintenance support responsibilities for other like items, i.e., AN/TRC-119.

e. Reference item concerning installation of teletype circuits, page 14, paragraph F2. USARV CEI item 82-2 established installation priority with operational circuits having first priority. Delay in providing teletype support was not due to a low priority of unit but rather to problems encountered by the move. Initially the buildings were not complete and installation was impossible. Construction of new cable facilities and allocation and routing of circuits to new locations were more time consuming than normal due to the magnitude of the moves and communications required.

f. Reference item concerning aviation unit callsigns, page 15, paragraph F3: Concur. Unit sponsor or unit liaison officer should coordinate with USARV prior to unit arriving in-country to insure that desired callsign is not already being used.

g. Reference item concerning aviation medical officers, page 16, paragraph G1: Concur. The acute shortage of flight surgeons has been relieved and no significant shortage currently exists in this command. This headquarters does not have factual information on the adequacy of the DA recruiting program for flight surgeons. Temporary specialty shortages may be caused by reasons other than recruiting failure, e.g., worldwide requirements, lack of training spaces, fund limitations, etc.

3. (U) A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies Furnished:

HQ, 1st Avn Bde  
ACSFOR

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GPOP-DT(14 Nov 67) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 1st Avn Bde  
(UIC: WDG3AA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 31 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report  
and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report  
as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph G4, page 19: This  
headquarters considers the physical examination to be  
essentially incomplete until such time as it has been  
reviewed and approved. A copy should be inserted in  
the health record of the individual concerned prior to  
his release for departure to RVN.

3. In view of the apparent problems concerning  
flight physicals as discussed in paragraphs G3 and G4,  
page 16, it is recommended that current directives  
and administrative procedures be reviewed for current  
applicability and be appropriately adhered to.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*K. F. Osbourn*  
K. F. OSBOURN  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Security Classification

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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